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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the exchange rate exposure of exporting firms in (the so far rarely 
addressed) largest Eastern European transition economies, i.e. Russia and three EU accession 
countries (CEEC-3). It also controls for possible effects of different exchange rate regimes. 
Substantially improving the results from the existing literature we find for more than 80% of 
firms in our sample a significant exchange rate exposure. However, the magnitude and 
direction of firms’ exposure depends on the particular exchange rate and clearly differs 
between Russia and the CEEC-3. We find that share prices increase with a depreciation of the 
domestic currency and only against the US Dollar in Russia, but decrease with a depreciation 
and only against the Euro in the CEEC-3. Such substantial differences may result from a 
differing dominance of exposure channels in the respective economies, such as the country-
specific export structure and foreign debt. Finally, the switch from a pegged to a flexible 
exchange rate regime appears to be less important for exposure. 
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Are exporting firms always a good hedge against currency risk? 
Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The exchange rate exposure of firms, i.e. the sensitivity of firms’ stock returns to 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, has been widely discussed since the end of the Bretton 
Woods system. Theoretical research, such as e.g. by Bodnar et al. (2002), underpins its 
importance for a firm’s value by identifying various channels through which exchange rate 
shocks are assumed to affect a firm’s profitability. Hence, from this perspective, a firm’s 
foreign exchange exposure should be thought relevant not only for risk management decisions 
of corporate managers, but also for international investors who seek to hedge their portfolio, 
since the exchange rate exposure is a function of the correlation between the returns of foreign 
assets and the exchange rate (see Chen et al. 2003 for a review on optimum hedge ratios). 
Finally, it should also be of interest for policy makers who have to decide about the 
appropriate exchange rate arrangement for a country. However, the empirical evidence on the 
theoretically suggested relevance of the exposure is mixed at best (Bodnar and Wong, 2003, 
He and Ng, 1998, see also Muller and Verschoor, 2006a).  
Our study sheds light on the exchange rate exposure of exporting firms in the four 
transition markets Russia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Transition markets have 
been least focused for this analysis so far. Most of empirical work is on Western 
industrialized economies (see e.g. Chamberlain et al., 1997, Glaum, 2000), where the 
exposure is found to be rather modest. However, empirical results suggest that exchange rate 
exposure seems to be higher in emerging economies: Kiymaz (2003) for example finds that 
the comparatively high share of 50% of Turkish firms is exposed to foreign exchange risk. 
Rossi (2011) finds a significant exposure of mixed sign in up to 37% (depending on the 
methodology) for a sample of Brazilian firms. Parsley and Popper (2006) find a substantial 
share of South East Asian firms to be exposed. Choe and Cook (2008) analyze 900 emerging 
market firms, but excluding transition economies, and find exposures of mixed sign. Entorf et 
al. (2005), who include the transition economies Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to their 
sample of 27 countries, provide a similar result for national stock market indices. They find 
insignificant exchange rate exposures on the aggregate level for the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC). The first study solely on Eastern European firms is presented by 
Muller and Verschoor (2007). They find a significant and on average positively signed 
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exchange rate exposure for only 19% of Czech, Hungarian and Polish multinational firms. 
Besides, they report a relation of the exchange rate exposure with firm size and trade 
openness. However, they only measure the exposure to fluctuations versus the US Dollar.  
The low number of studies on CEEC is surprising, as several factors make them an 
interesting region for analyzing exchange rate exposure. First, most of the countries show an 
extremely high degree of international trade integration and, thus, form examples of highly 
open economies. This mainly applies to the new member states of the European Union, but 
also for Russia, as one of the world's largest exporters of oil and gas. Second, firms in CEEC 
have less access to financial instruments for hedging their foreign exchange risk. This is due 
to the comparatively less liquid financial and particularly the foreign exchange market. This 
lack of financial hedging instruments may also result in a currency mismatch and is seen as 
one of the main reasons for the well-known “fear of floating”-phenomenon. These first 
factors, the high degree of trade integration on the one hand, and the lack of hedging 
opportunities at the same time, mean that firms in CEEC are expected to be more vulnerable 
to shocks from the foreign exchange markets. Third, and from a European perspective most 
important, the CEEC as well as Russia have become important trade partners in the European 
Union. Thus, the analysis of their exposure to the Euro, besides the one to the US Dollar, is of 
high relevance as well. Fourth and finally, since the history of CEEC and Russia covers 
various different exchange rate arrangements, including comparatively rigid horizontal and 
crawling pegs, managed and free floats, they allow studying possible effects of the exchange 
rate system on exchange rate exposure of firms. For all of these reasons, we expect the 
exposure of the Eastern European firms to be more pronounced than that found in Western 
industrialized economies.  
Therefore, we contribute to the literature by, first, providing evidence on the exchange 
rate exposure of exporting firms in the CEEC. We substantially improve the results for Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland1, compared to the existing literature, which has analyzed the 
exchange rate exposure either solely on the aggregate level (Entorf et al. 2005) or on the firm 
level but only versus the US dollar (Muller and Verschoor 2007), although CEEC perform 
most of their trade with European Countries. Furthermore we are – to the best of our 
knowledge – the first to provide an analysis for Russia. Second, we address the ambiguity of 
findings in the literature: Thinking of potentially offsetting effects competing  impacts from a 
textbook-like positive expenditure switching effect and negative balance-sheet effects on the 
other hand we assume that the relevance of these channels and thus the direction of exposure 
                                                 
1
 These are the three most important stock markets among the new member countries of the European Union. 
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may vary in single markets. Our result corroborates  with those by Morck et al. (2000) and 
Chue and Cook (2008), who come to the conclusion that for emerging markets the within-
country correlation is higher than in developed markets and thus country-specific factors can 
be expected to be more relevant compared to firm-specific factors in emerging markets.  
Hence, we do not pool all countries in just one joint sample, but regard the CEEC-3 and 
Russia separately. This split should avoid a canceling-out of opposite exposure directions, if 
there were any. It can be justified by similar export structures within the CEEC-3, which 
clearly differ from the Russian one. Third, in addition to the US Dollar, we also analyze the 
exposure to the Euro, which has been neglected in the literature for Eastern Europe so far, 
although the European Union is the by far most important trade partner for the Eastern 
European countries. Fourth, since most CEEC started with comparatively tight pegs, before 
they proceeded to more flexible exchange rate arrangements, the question arises whether the 
exchange rate regime affects the foreign exchange risk exposure of firms. Our sample period  
allows to examine this. Fifth, in contrast to existing studies using daily data we take volatility 
clusters into account and apply a GARCH model, thus improving the accuracy of our 
estimates. 
The evidence rather favors our approach. First, we find over 80% of exporting firms in 
our sample to be significantly exposed  to daily exchange rate movements in both, Russia and 
the CEEC-3. This exposure is clearly higher than those reported in the literature so far (e.g. 
50% in Kyimaz (2003) for Turkey,  37% in Rossi (2011) for Brazil, 20% in Dominguez and 
Tesar (2006) for eight (non-US) industrialized and emerging markets; 19% in Muller and 
Verschoor (2007) for Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Second, in Russia compared to 
CEEC-3, the exposures to the US Dollar and Euro indeed have different magnitudes and 
opposed directions – a significant finding, not yet documented in the literature. In detail, the 
exposure of exporting firms’ stock returns to the US Dollar is considerable and negative in 
Russia, but only small and positive in the CEEC-3. In contrast, the exposure to the Euro is not 
significant in Russia, but of considerable magnitude and positive in the CEEC-3.2 Finally, the 
exposure seems not to be substantially influenced by fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Several implications can be derived from our results. Our findings confirm the 
convincing intuition for the significant dependence of the CEEC-3 on the Euro rate and also 
support the expectation for a differing importance of exposure transmission channels in single 
countries: Whereas the expenditure switching effect appears to dominate in Russia, in the 
                                                 
2
 A negative (positive) exposure means that a depreciation of the domestic currency goes along with an increase 
(decrease) of a firm’s share price. 
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CEEC-3 balance sheet effects seem to be more relevant. Thus, our results matter for both, 
investors and researchers. For investors, since the reference currency as well as country-
specific structures matter for the direction and strength of exchange rate exposure, and 
therefore affect strategies for hedging currency risk, and for researchers, since pooling firms 
from various countries may weaken the results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent Section 2 reviews 
the theoretical rationale behind exchange rate exposure. Section 3 and Section 4 introduce our 
dataset and methodology. Our empirical results are described in Section 5, while Section 6 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The FX Exposure of Firms 
There are several potential channels through which a firm’s value may be affected by 
movements on the foreign exchange market. First, an appreciation of the domestic currency 
may erode the firm’s competitiveness on international markets, since the revenues of the firm 
get smaller. The opposite holds in the case of a depreciation. The effect does of course reverse 
for importing firms, as the price for their imports in local currency rise. Second, Even if a 
company is purely domestic, i.e., it does not export nor import at all, it might be affected 
through the channel of competitiveness, as an appreciation of the domestic currency may 
support foreign competitors in the domestic market. Furthermore, exporting firms are often 
supposed to hold foreign assets related to their foreign business. The value of foreign assets 
decreases (increases) with an appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currencies.  
Second, domestic firms with net foreign denominated debt will gain (lose) with an 
appreciating (depreciating) domestic currency3. This was a problem in CEEC particularly 
during the first years of transition, as the underdeveloped financial markets forced firms to 
borrow abroad, whereas foreign lenders were not willing to lend in the currency of the 
transition economy, which led to a currency mismatch (see Eichengreen et al., 2003, the 
“original sin”). Obviously the effect of foreign denominated debt is unrelated with the firm’s 
role as an exporter or importer, but solely depends on the financing structure of the company. 
Furthermore there is an indirect effect, since private households and the public sector holding 
debt denominated in foreign currency may also cut their expenses if the domestic currency 
                                                 
3
 This is part of the translation exposure (Muller and Verschoor 2006a). There may of course also be the case of 
foreign assets, which is less relevant for transition economies. Muller and Verschoor (2006a) furthermore refer 
to transaction and contractual exposure. Since their effect should be short-lived we do not consider them further.  
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depreciates and accordingly their debt burden in domestic currency increases. Thus, domestic 
demand will decrease. 
Finally, share prices and currency fluctuations may be connected via capital flows due to 
portfolio investments. If foreign investors buy domestic stocks they might move both, the 
exchange rate and the stock price. Although this implies a co-movement of the domestic 
currency and the stock price – rather than what is traditionally understood as the foreign 
exchange exposure – this relation may be found in empirical testing. Similarly to foreign debt, 
portfolio investments are of particular importance for CEEC, which have been exposed to 
substantial amounts of capital inflows (or outflows) during the last two decades, making them 
more similar to other emerging economies than to industrialized developed countries. 
Table 1 summarizes the respective effects on share prices. The case is obviously easier 
for importing and domestic firms, for which all channels point to the same direction. In 
contrast, the share prices of exporting firms may on the one hand benefit from a depreciation 
due to increased competitiveness, or they may suffer from the increased debt burden or from 
lower demand due to capital outflows that at the same time let the currency depreciate.  
The ambiguous relations between exchange rate fluctuations and share prices also 
explain why empirical studies in most cases find a comparatively low foreign exchange 
exposure (for a survey see Muller and Verschoor, 2006a). The question of which effect is 
dominating is therefore an empirical one and does not even necessarily lead to the same result 
in each single country. 
 
3. Data  
This study considers the four largest Eastern European stock markets of Russia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland (CEEC-3). Thereby, the focus is on daily returns of all stocks 
which have ever been included to the respective domestic stock index and which are available 
on DataStream. The use of daily data is common in the literature (see e.g. Chamberlain et al., 
1997, Di Iorio and Faff, 2000, Glaum, 2000). As can be seen from Table 2, our sample 
includes 92 stocks that are available on DataStream (out of 133 stocks which have ever been 
in the index) from the stock index RTS in Russia, 12 (55) from the PX in the Czech Republic, 
17 (18) from the BUX in Hungary, and 28 (49) from the WIG in Poland. Our sample covers 
the period from September 1st, 1995 – April 30th, 2009, and therefore nearly the whole 
transition period, except the most volatile phase in its earliest stage. 
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We assign each market’s stocks to three portfolios, containing exporting, importing and 
domestic firms, respectively. A firm is defined as an “exporting” (“importing”) one if the 
share of its revenues from export (import) sales to total sales exceeds 40%. If both shares are 
below 40%, a company is assigned to the portfolio “domestic”. Assigning a firm to the groups 
according to their share of foreign activities is commonly used in the empirical literature. 
Pritamani et al. (2004) suggest a share of 50%. Since our lower share of 40% classifies more 
firms as exporting or importing, this choice heightens the stakes to find any impact of 
exchange rate changes and makes our conclusions even more conservative. 
Overall, our classification results in 51 exporting firms, 7 importing firms and 91 
domestic firms. Due to the small number of importing firms, we only focus on exporting and 
domestic stocks in further analysis. Table A.1 in the appendix additionally gives a short 
description of exporting firms’ activities as well as their engagement in export sales. 
The three EU-markets Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are also jointly analyzed 
as a CEEC-3 group, since only a small number of stocks is available for a single country, in 
particular for the Czech Republic or Hungary. This grouping can be justified by the fact that 
the three countries turn out to provide quite similar results. Thus, we end up with two 
comparatively homogeneous groups: Russia with 30 exporting and 58 domestic, and the 
CEEC-3 with 21 exporting and 33 domestic firms’ stocks (see Table 2).  
Since the CEEC-3 have not yet joined European Monetary Union and introduced a 
common currency, we need to construct a synthetic domestic currency, as a weighted average 
of the country-specific domestic currencies. To calculate these synthetic exchange rates for 
the CEEC-3 group, i.e. EUR/CEEC-3 and USD/CEEC-3, we use the IMF DOT (direction of 
trade) statistics data on the Czech, Hungarian and Polish exports to the Euro-Area-16 and the 
USA. The weight for the respective market’s exchange rate within the effective exchange rate 
is calculated as its respective share of export in the total CEEC-3 exports to the Euro-Area-16 
and the USA. 
This results in a rather equal weighting of the Czech, Hungarian and Polish exchange 
rates within both effective exchange rates for the CEEC-3: 
∆EUR/CEEC-3 = 0.37⋅∆(EUR/CZK) + 0.28⋅∆(EUR/HUF) + 0.35⋅∆(EUR/PLZ) 
∆USD/CEEC-3 = 0.32⋅∆(USD/CZK) + 0.36⋅∆(USD/HUF) + 0.32⋅∆(USD/PLZ) 
Thus, the effective exchange rates represent the price of the constructed synthetic 
“domestic” currency of the CEEC-3 group versus the Euro and the US Dollar, respectively. 
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4. Methodology  
We measure exchange rate exposure by estimating the equation  
 ri,t = αi + βi⋅rm,t + γi,€⋅∆e€ + γi,$⋅∆e$ + Σk=1..Kδi,k⋅Dt,k + εt  (1) 
which is an extension of the commonly used approach by Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion 
(1990). In equation (1) ri,t is the return of a portfolio of stocks or a single share i on day t; rm,t 
is the return of a benchmark portfolio; ∆e
€
 and ∆e$ are changes of the price of the domestic 
currency versus the Euro and the US Dollar, respectively4. Such bilateral rates have been 
used, for instance, by Williamson (2001) and Parsley and Popper (2006), while most existing 
studies rely on effective exchange rates. Although not incorporating it in one equation, 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006) also stress the different importance of currencies for the 
exposure. Dt,k are appropriate dummies, i.e. for the introduction of the Euro (January 1, 1999) 
and for the accession to the European Union (January 1, 2004 for the CEEC-3). In addition, 
our regression also contains calendar dummies for January and December to account for a 
potential turn-of-the-year effect (see Reinganum, 1983).5 
The benchmark portfolio differs from the market portfolio in two respects: First, 
according to Bodnar and Wong (2003) a value-weighted portfolio may lower the significance 
because large international) firms are more likely to be exposed to currency risk. They 
suggest using an equally-weighted portfolio. Pritamani et al. (2004) go one step further and 
suggest using a benchmark portfolio that exclusively contains shares of domestic stocks. This 
is to avoid that it is affected by the exchange rate exposure of exporting firms under 
consideration here. Second, since one may also expect domestic firms to be exposed to 
exchange rate changes, a multicollinearity problem occurs. We therefore additionally 
orthogonalize the market return on exchange rate fluctuations by running a side regression of 
the portfolio of domestic stocks on exchange rate changes, as suggested by, e.g., He et al. 
(1996) or Kiymaz (2003)6. Our benchmark return therefore measures the market return that is 
                                                 
4
 The use of the changes of the domestic currency against the US Dollar and the Euro in the same equation may 
potentially lead to multicollinearity problems, which make it difficult to distinguish the individual effects of the 
currencies. The reason is that multicollinearity, although it will not bias the estimates, increases the standard 
errors on the individual coefficient estimates. However, multicollinearity seems not to be a serious problem. The 
correlations between the exchange rate returns versus the US Dollar and Euro respectively are about 0.45. Both, 
Parsley and Popper (2006) and Williamson (2001), use a similar approach and find correlations that in some 
cases reach 80-90%. As in our analysis, they do not experience estimation problems in terms of inflated standard 
errors. 
5
 We also added dummies to account for potential day-of-the-week effects. The results however, are not 
significant nor do they improve the estimations. Therefore we do not report them, they are available from the 
authors on request. 
6
 As a robustness check we also regressed the exchange rate changes on the benchmark portfolio, as also found 
in the literature (see Choi and Prasad 1995). This does, however, not substantially change the results.  
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not explained by currency fluctuations. Accordingly, the coefficients γi,€ and γi,$ provide the 
residual exchange rate exposure of firm i (Muller and Verschoor, 2006a). 
Since financial time series at daily frequency generally suffer from hetereoskedasticity 
and volatility clustering, we model the error term εt as a GJR-GARCH model (Glosten et al., 
1993) that additionally allows for an asymmetric reaction of volatility to the sign of the 
previous return: 
 εt∼N(0,σt2)  
 σt
2
 = ω + α⋅σt-1
2
 + β⋅εt-12 + γ⋅I>0(εt-1) (2) 
where I>0(⋅) is an indicator function that takes the value one, if the argument is positive and 
zero else. The estimates show that the use of a GARCH-type model is justified, the 
coefficients α and β, and in most cases also γ are significant and reflect both, conditional 
heteroskedasticity and asymmetry in the volatility process.  
Equation (1) treats the exchange rate exposure as being independent from the exchange 
rate regime. Since the choice of an exchange rate regime may also affect firms’ exposure to 
currency risk, we additionally use dummy variables that reflect pegged, and therefore less 
variable, exchange rates and estimate interaction terms of these dummies with the exchange 
rate exposure coefficients. Equation (1) then evolves to: 
ri,t = αi + βi⋅rm,t + γi,€⋅∆e€ + γi,$⋅∆e$ + Σk=1..Kδi,k⋅Dt,k + Σk=1..K(ϑi,€ ⋅∆e€Dt,k + ϑi,$ ⋅∆e$Dt,k) + εt  (3) 
and differs from equation (1) by the interaction terms ∆e
€
Dt,k,€ and ∆e$Dt,k$, which shall 
capture a change in the foreign exchange exposure (e.g. a different level) during times of 
pegged exchange rate regimes compared to floating ones.  
The dummies Dt,k,€ and Dt,k$ take the value one, if the domestic currency is pegged to 
the € or $ respectively, and zero else. In detail, these dummies indicate the following periods. 
Before passing over into a managed or a free float, in the Czech Republic, the exchange rate 
was pegged to a basket of Deutsche Mark and US Dollar until May 26, 1997; in Poland – to a 
basket including both, Deutsche Mark/EUR and US Dollar, until April 11, 2000; and in 
Hungary – to a basket of Deutsche Mark/EUR and US Dollar until December 31, 1999, and 
only to EUR since January 1st, 2000 until February 26, 2008. As the time of abandoning the 
fixed exchange rate regime differ, it is not possible to introduce one joint dummy variable for 
all the three CEEC markets here. In the Russian Federation, there are two regime switches 
observable in our sample. During the Russian crisis, the initial peg to the US Dollar was 
replaced by a floating exchange rate regime starting on September 2nd, 1998. However, since 
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February 1st, 2005 the Ruble has been again pegged, this time to a bi-currency basket 
consisting of Euro and US Dollar.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Results on the Aggregate Level 
Baseline Results 
The estimation results for the portfolios are given in Table 3a (portfolio of exporting 
firms). For comparison we also report the results for the benchmark portfolio in Table 3b. In 
all equations in Table 3a the relation with the benchmark portfolio is highly significant and of 
considerable size. In contrast, the impact of the remaining variables differs substantially. We 
find significant January and December effects for the CEEC-3, which are obviously mainly 
due to the Polish market. The introduction of the Euro in 1999 and the accession of the 
CEEC-3 to the European Union in 2004 only have a marginal (although in some cases 
significant) effect. Furthermore, we find a significant, but economically negligible effect of 
both variables on the Russian domestic portfolio (Table 3b).   
However, the coefficients on the exchange rate exposure show, first, a clear and 
significant pattern, and second, remarkable differences between Russia on the one and the 
CEEC-3 on the other hand.  
Both, the Russian and the Central European share prices show a significant relation with 
exchange rate changes. This applies to exporting firms and for Russia also to domestic firms. 
The effect is economically significant; the most pronounced coefficients are close to 0.4, 
meaning that a one per cent change in the exchange rate goes along with a change in the stock 
return by almost 0.4 per cent. This result is roughly in line with Chue and Cook (2008), who 
report an average (but positive) exposure of 0.4 for a set of 15 non-European emerging 
markets although using an effective exchange rate and are economically significant. 
It turns out that stocks of exporting firms (Table 3a) on the Russian market react 
strongly and significantly negatively to changes in the USD/RUB exchange rate, meaning that 
a depreciation of the Ruble leads ceteris paribus to increasing share prices. This is in line with 
the competitiveness channel, which means that foreign revenues of Russian exporters 
increase, if the Ruble depreciates. The observation can be explained by the particular structure 
of the Russian exporting sector, which is characterized by a substantial share of oil and gas 
exporting firms, but also companies from the metals and mining sector, see Table A.1 in the 
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appendix. This has two effects: First, since these products are to a large extent traded in US 
Dollar, while most of the expenses are paid in Ruble, a depreciation of the Ruble immediately 
increases the firm's profits. Accordingly, the reaction of Russian exporting firms to changes in 
the EUR/RUB rate is moderate and insignificant. Second, since the traded goods are rather 
homogeneous, the price setting abilities of exporters on the world market are limited, which 
increases the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on exporters' revenues. 
Exporting firms in the CEEC-3, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, show 
different behavior: In contrast to Russian exporting firms, their returns are mainly exposed to 
changes in the Euro exchange rate, and only to a small extent (albeit significantly) to changes 
in the US Dollar exchange rate. Furthermore, their currency risk exposure shows the opposite 
sign compared with the Russian exporting firms, i.e. an appreciation of the domestic 
currencies goes along with price increases of the exporting firms.  
The results raise the question which channels – other than changes in firm’s 
competitiveness – dominate for the CEEC-3. As mentioned in the introduction, mainly 
portfolio investments and foreign debt may cause a positive (but in the case of portfolio 
investments not necessarily causal) relation between the price of the domestic currency and 
the share price of exporting firms7. Unfortunately, both series are not available at high 
frequency but only on a yearly basis, so we cannot incorporate them into our model, but 
consider their evolution over time to detect explanatory differences between the CEEC-3 and 
Russia.  
For domestic firms (Table 3b) we find that their currency exposure in Russia shows the 
same inverse relation with the exchange rate of the US Dollar as for the exporting firms, 
while there is a significantly positive relation with changes in the RUB/EUR rate. The Euro 
exposure, however, is substantially smaller, in absolute terms, than the exposure to the US 
Dollar, 0.029 compared to -0.342. For the CEEC-3 we do not find any significant exchange 
rate exposure for domestic firms at all.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of inflows of portfolio investments for Russia and the 
CEEC-3 calculated as per cent of the stock market capitalization. It serves as a measure of the 
dependence of the stock market on foreign investors. The difference is comparatively small, 
                                                 
7
 We also checked whether the difference can be due to an asymmetric exchange rate exposure (see Koutmos 
and Martin 2003) in combination with a long term exchange rate trend, since Poland and Hungary maintained a 
crawling peg for a substantial fraction of the sample period (Hungary until October 2001, Poland until April 
2000), which led to a long-lasting depreciation of the domestic currency. However, although the exchange 
exposure is slightly higher, if the exchange rate depreciates (0.525 versus 0.458) the difference is small and not 
statistically significant.  
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although the CEEC-3 show a slightly higher share of foreign investors, particularly in the first 
half of the sample period. It seems to be unlikely that this difference is responsible for the 
huge difference in foreign exchange risk exposures between the CEEC-3 and Russia. 
In contrast, the difference in the amount of foreign debt, as displayed in Figure 2, is 
much larger.8 While all countries but the Czech Republic show a substantial increase in 
private external debt (most pronounced for Hungary, where the foreign debt quadrupled 
during the sample period), the levels are different: in Russia it increased smoothly to a 
moderate level of slightly more than 20% of GDP in 2009. In the CEEC-3, the share of 
foreign debt is substantially higher (peaking at 80% of GDP for Hungary) and sharply 
increasing in Hungary and Poland. Therefore, due to their high dependence on foreign debt, 
the CEEC-3 seem to be much more vulnerable to currency risk than Russia. Furthermore, for 
the CEEC-3 the Euro plays a dominating role for funding: Most of the foreign debt in the 
CEEC-3 is denominated in Euro, and just a small fraction in US Dollar9, while in Russia the 
US Dollar plays a more prominent role. In view of that, the foreign debt channel is likely to 
dominate for the CEEC-3, causing the observed positive relation between the domestic 
currency price and the share prices of exporting firms. 
 
The Impact of the Exchange Rate Regime 
The countries under consideration have experienced various exchange rate regimes. All 
countries started with comparatively tight pegs. The Bank of Russia pegged the Ruble to the 
US Dollar until they switched to a managed float in September 1998. In February 2005 they 
again introduced a peg, this time to a currency basket consisting of the Euro and the US 
Dollar, in which the Euro gained subsequently higher importance. The Czech Republic 
abandoned their peg (65% Deutsche Mark and 35% US Dollar) in May 1997 after a currency 
crisis and introduced a managed float. Hungary started with a crawling peg against a basket of 
Deutsche Mark and US Dollar, before the Euro was introduced as the only anchor currency in 
January 2000.  Only in 2010 the Hungarian Forint was allowed to float. Finally, the Polish 
central bank relied on a crawling peg, and switched in January 1999 from a multi-currency-
                                                 
8
  While figure 2 displays the debt denominated in foreign currency for the whole private sector captures both the 
direct and the indirect impact on firms, the picture does not change a lot, if we only consider corporate debt, see 
Haiss and Rainer (2012). 
9
 Czech Republic: 86.1% in Euro/10.8% in US Dollar, Hungary: 66.0%/13.4%, Poland: 68.7%/17.4% 
(outstanding bonds and notes in the respective currency as a fraction oft he total amount of internationally issued 
bonds and notes of he respective country in 2004, source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). 
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basket of five currencies to a basket of Euro and US Dollar. The latter episode lasted not 
much more than one year: Since April 2000 the Zloty floats freely. 
In order to test for the impact of the exchange rate regime we additionally add 
interaction terms between a dummy for fixed exchange rate regimes and the exchange rate 
returns. The dummy takes the value one, if the domestic currency is pegged against the 
respective currency and zero otherwise. The Czech Republic is a special case: Since the 
composition of the basket never changed  we use the interaction term between the dummy and 
the return of the basket. Otherwise multicollinearity problems occur. Thus we cannot 
distinguish the impact on the exposure for each currency separately. 
The results can also be found in Tables 3a and 3b, as an extra column next to the 
baseline regressions.  The results, however, are mixed and not clear. Although we find a 
significant relation between the exchange rate regime and exchange rate exposure of 
exporting firms for Poland (USD and EUR), the Czech Republic and Hungary (both only 
USD) and of domestic firms for Poland (EUR), Hungary (USD) and Russia (USD), the signs 
of the coefficients differ and do not show a clear pattern. We therefore conclude that, at best, 
the exchange rate regime plays a minor role for the (level of) exchange rate exposure of firms.  
 
Stability of the Coefficients 
The question arises how stable the coefficients found are over time. For this purpose we 
employ both rolling regressions and an analysis of subsamples for our portfolios of exporting 
firms. For the rolling regressions we use an estimation window of 500 observations. For the 
subsamples we split the total sample into three periods of similar length. Subsample 1 (1995 
to 1999) includes the turbulent first years of transmission with the currency crises in the 
Czech Republic (1997) and Russia (1998) and the rise of the dotcom bubble in the Western 
economies. Subsample 2 (2000-2004) is the burst of the dotcom bubble and subsample 3 
(2005-2009) is the tranquil period preceding the current financial crisis.  
The rolling regressions, shown in Figure 3 exhibit a fairly stable exchange rate exposure 
for the Russian Ruble against the US Dollar. However, the graph also shows a substantial 
impact of the Russian crisis 1998 on the stability of the coefficients. During the crisis the 
coefficient becomes extremely unstable and even changes its sign. The most likely reason are 
withdrawals of foreign portfolio investments during the crisis which put pressure on both the 
value of the Ruble and share prices. Another more volatile period are the years 2003 to 2005. 
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However, excluding these periods from the sample does not substantially change the 
estimations.  
We do not observe the same stability for the exposure of Russian firms’ shares to the 
Euro: The value fluctuates around zero and change their sign several times. The picture from 
the rolling regressions is confirmed by looking at the subperiods (Table 4). While the 
exposure to the Euro is (even significantly) positive during the first subsample, it fluctuates 
around zero for the subperiods 2 and 3. In contrast, the coefficient for the exposure to the US 
Dollar is reliably negative for all subperiods with value smallest in absolute terms during the 
period 2000 to 2004.  
The results for the CEEC-3 confirm those for the whole sample. The exposure to the 
Euro is significantly positive for the rolling regression as well as for all three subsamples. 
Again, we find a decline in magnitude for the subsample 2000 to 2004. The dispersion of the 
exposure seems to be slightly higher than in the case of Russia. Furthermore, it seems that 
recently the exposure of the CEEC-3 to the US Dollar has substantially increased and became 
significant.  
 
5.2 Results on the Firm Level 
Since the empirical literature suggests that estimations on the firm level provide clearer 
results than on the aggregate level (Khoo, 1994, Choi and Prasad, 1995, Muller and 
Verschoor, 2006b), we additionally estimate equation (1) on the firm level. The results are 
given in Table 5a for exporting and 5b for domestic firms. They confirm and strengthen our 
insights from the aggregate level (Tables 3a and 3ba).  
For Russia, the negative exposure to the US Dollar rate is striking. Out of 30 exporting 
firms, the share price of 28 firms increases when the Ruble depreciates, which is significant 
for 25 firms. From the only two firms with a positive exposure, one is significant.10 The 
exposure of Russian exporting firms to changes in the Euro rate is almost equally distributed 
(17 negative, 13 positive) and insignificant in most cases. The distribution for Russian 
domestic firms looks similar, although with a higher share of significant exposures to the 
Euro rate (about 50% here). 
                                                 
10
 This single Russian exporting firm with a significantly positive exposure is Mechel OAO, Russia’s largest 
exporter of coking coal concentrate, having an exchange rate exposure of 1.681 to Euro and of 1.658 to the US 
Dollar. We resisted the temptation to re-categorize this company and kept in the set of exporting firms, leaving 
our results more conservative. 
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Again, the CEEC-3 present a contrary picture with positive exposures mainly to the 
Euro rate. This is the case for 19 (18 of them being significant) out of 21 exporting firms. The 
exposure to the US Dollar exchange rate is less pronounced, but a slight majority of firms also 
shows positive coefficients. In contrast to the aggregate level, the domestic firms also show a 
more pronounced positive exposure to the Euro exchange rate (31 out of 33, 24 being 
significant). This result is in line with the before assumed dominance of the foreign debt 
channel for the CEEC-3, as the value of foreign debt, which is substantial in the CEEC-3, 
naturally affects the price of a firm, mo matter whether it is an exporting or a domestic one. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper extends the scarce literature on foreign exchange exposure in Eastern 
European transition markets by examining the relationship between their exporting firms’ 
stock returns and fluctuations in both, the US Dollar and Euro exchange rates. In particular, 
we focus on the four transition economies Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland (CEEC-3) and 
Russia in the period from September 1995 to April 2009.  
In both, Russia and the CEEC-3, we find statistically and economically significant, but 
different patterns of exposure to the two reference currencies. (1) In Russia, 80% of exporting 
firms exhibit a strong and negative exposure to the US Dollar rate, meaning that a 
depreciation of domestic currency against the US Dollar goes along with an increase of 
exporting firms’ share prices. This result suggests a dominant effect arising through the 
competitiveness channel. Thereby, the exposure to the Euro is mixed and significant only for 
20% of Russian firms. (2) By contrast, in the CEEC-3, 86% of exporting firms display a 
strong and positive exposure to the Euro rate and only a slight one to the US Dollar, which 
can rather be explained by the foreign debt channel. (3) Furthermore, we find that the 
exchange rate regime does not seem to be substantially relevant for share prices. 
Our results provide one possible explanation for why many empirical studies fail to find 
a clear exchange rate exposure (see e.g. the survey by Muller and Verschoor, 2006a). Since 
most of these studies include firms from a variety of countries, the poor results may be partly 
due to the disappearance of separated country-specific effects in cross-country samples. In our 
sample, this would mean that the revealed opposite signs of exposures in Russia and the 
CEEC-3 cancel out in a joint sample.  
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Moreover, finding exporting firms not always feature a negative exposure to foreign 
exchange movements, investors should be aware that investments in exporting firms are not 
always a good hedge against foreign exchange risk, as it might be conventional wisdom. Our 
results show that the direction of the exposure to the US Dollar and Euro varies countrywise. 
Being a US investor in Russia, the foreign exchange risk (of an investment in Ruble) can be 
partly hedged by buying stocks of Russian exporting firms. The latter would at least 
compensate for a depreciation of the Ruble by increasing share prices. However, this hedging 
effect would not exist for a Euro-zone investor in the CEEC-3. By contrast, as in the CEEC-3 
the exposure of exporting firms to the Euro is positive, a depreciation of the CEEC-3 
currencies against the Euro goes along with decreasing share prices of exporting firms. 
Therefore, this effect would even more reduce the profits from holding CEEC-3 exporting 
firms. For the US Dollar, the exposure is much weaker but not clear in direction. Thus, 
investors should distinguish these country- and currency-specific effects, when aiming to 
hedge their foreign investments against foreign exchange risk. 
Finally, one potential reason for the found opposite exposures in our two sub-samples 
might be the varying dominance of the exposure transmission channels in Russia and the 
CEEC-3. We may assume all the three channels – influencing share prices through the 
competitiveness, the foreign debt or portfolio investments – to have some impact. However, 
in particular the dominance of the competitiveness channel in Russia suggests the structure of 
exports to be of particular relevance here. Russia mostly exports homogeneous goods like oil 
and gas (according to the Statistical Office of the Russian Federation, mineral products 
account for almost two third of Russian exports), which price is in USD as well as largely 
determined by the world market and not by the firm itself. This makes Russian exporting 
firms more vulnerable to changes in the exchange rate, which directly affect their profits. 
Exporting mostly not fully homogeneous industrial products (according to the EBRD, over 
50% of total CEEC-3 exports are sold to the EU, thus generating revenues in EUR), the firms 
in the CEEC-3 might be able to adjust their prices to their domestic currency price 
fluctuations. Thus, assuming that exporting homogeneous goods (like oil and gas) provides 
fewer opportunities to compensate for lost profits (due to currency risk) by price adjustments, 
the exposure to exchange rate fluctuations rises and gets more negative. This view provides 
an alternative explanation for Russian exporters’ high exposure to the USD/RUB rate 
fluctuations and, thus, for a strong competitiveness channel in Russia. However, although 
exchange rate exposure has “many facets” (Bartram et al., 2010), we retrieve remarkably 
stable results per country group.  
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Summing up, our results allow for relevant conclusions and implications from both the 
practical and the academic perspective. Investors should take into account that firms’ 
exposure to the price of a foreign currency may differ across economies. Due to this, 
researchers should not merge (economically) differing economies in just one sample, because 
otherwise country-specific exposures, which result from a country’s individual economic and 
export structure, might cancel each other out. This would hinder the detection of a clear 
exchange rate exposure. 
  
18 
References 
 
Adler, M., Dumas, B. (1984). Exposure to Currency Risk: Definition and Measurement, 
Financial Management 13 (Summer), 41-50. 
Bartram, S.M., Brown, G.W., and Minton, B.A. (2010). Resolving the Exposure Puzzle: The 
Many Facets of Exchange Rate Exposure, Journal of Financial Economics 95:2, 148-
173. 
Bodnar, G., Dumas, B., and Marston R. (2002). Pass-through and Exposure, Journal of 
Finance 57, 199–231. 
Bodnar, G.B., Wong M.H.F. (2003). Estimating Exchange rate Exposures: Issues in Model 
Structure, Financial Management 32, 35-67.,  
Chamberlain, S., Howe, J.S., and Popper, H. (1997). The Exchange Rate Exposure of US and 
Japanese Banking Institutions, Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 871-889. 
Chen Sheng-Syan, Cheng-Fee Lee and Keshab Shrestha (2003). Futures Hedge Ratios: A 
Review, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 43, 433-465. 
Choi, J.J., Prasad, A.M. (1995). Exchange Risk Sensitivity and its Determinants: A Firm and 
Industry Analysis of US multinationals, Financial Management 24, 77–88. 
Chue, T.K., Cook, D. (2008). Emerging Market Exchange Rate Exposure, Journal of Banking 
& Finance 32, 1349–1362. 
Di Ioro, A., Faff, R. (2000). An Analysis of Asymmetry in Foreign Currency Exposure of the 
Australian Equities Markets, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 10, 133-
159. 
Dominguez, K.M.E., Tesar, L.L. (2006). Exchange Rate Exposure, Journal of International 
Economics 68:1, 188-218. 
Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R., and Panizza, U. (2003). Currency Mismatches, Debt  
Intolerance and Original Sin: Why They are not the Same, Why it Matters, NBER 
Working Paper no. 10036. 
Entorf, H., Möbert, J., and Sonderhof, K. (2007). The Foreign Exchange Rate Exchange Rate 
Exposure Nations, ZEW Discussion Paper 07-005.  
Glaum, M. (2000). Foreign Exchange Risk Management in German Non-Financial 
Corporations: An Empirical Analysis, in: Frenkel, M. Hommel, U. Rudolf, M. (Eds): 
Risk Management: Challenge and Opportunity, Springer, Berlin, 373-393. 
Glosten, L. R., Jagannathan, R. and Runkle, D. E. (1993). On the Relation between the 
Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks, Journal of 
Finance, American Finance Association, 48:5, 1779-1801. 
Haiss, Peter R. and Wolfgang Rainer (2012). Credit Euroization in Eastern Europe: The 
Foreign Funds Channel at Work, Comparative Economic Studies 54, 471-505. 
  
19 
He, J., Ng, L. and Wu, X. (1996). Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure, Risk and the Japanese 
Stock Market. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin. 
Jorion, P. (1990). The Exchange Rate Exposure of U.S. Multinationals, Journal of Business 
63, 331-345. 
Keim, D.B. (1983). Size-Related Anomalies and Stock Return Seasonality: Further Empirical 
Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 12, 13−32. 
Khoo, A. (1994). Estimation of Foreign Exchange Exposure: An Application to Mining 
Companies in Australia, Journal of International Money and Finance 13, 342–36 
Kiymaz, H. (2003). Estimation of Foreign Exchange Exposure: An Emerging Market 
Application, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 13, 71-84. 
Koutmos, G., Martin, A.D. (2003). Asymmetric Exchange Rate Exposure: Theory and 
Evidence, Journal of International Money and Finance 22:3, 365-383. 
Lane, P.R., G.M. Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Capital Flows to Central and Eastern Europe, 
Emerging Markets Review 8, 106-123. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W. (2000). The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do 
Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 215–260. 
Muller, A., Verschoor, W.F.C. (2006a). Foreign Exchange Risk Exposure: Survey and 
Suggestions, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 16, 385-410. 
Muller, A., Verschoor, W.F.C. (2006b). European Foreign Exchange Risk Exposure, 
European Financial Management 12:2, 195-220. 
Muller, A., Verschoor, W.F.C. (2007). Trade and Exposure of Eastern European 
Multinationals, Emerging Markets Review 8, 218-229. 
Parsley, D. C., Popper, H. A. (2006). Exchange Rate Pegs and Foreign Exchange Exposure in 
East and South East Asia, Journal of International Money and Finance 25, 992-1009. 
Pritamani, M. D., Shome, D. K., and Singal, V. (2004). Foreign Exchange Exposure of 
Exporting and Importing Firms, Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 1697-1710. 
Reinganum, M.R. (1983). The Anomalous Stock Market Behavior of Small Firms in January: 
Empirical Tests for Tax-Loss Selling Effects, Journal of Financial Economics 12, 
89−104. 
Rossi, José Luiz Jr. (2011). Exchange Rate Exposure, Foreign Currency Debt, and the Use of 
Derivatives: Evidence from Brazil, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 47:1, 67-89. 
Williamson, R. (2001). Exchange Rate Exposure and Competition: Evidence from the 
Automotive Industry, Journal of Financial Economics 59, 441-475. 
  
20 
TABLE 1.  Relations between share prices and exchange rate 
 Exporting firms Importing firms Domestic firms 
Competitiveness channel – a)  + (+) b) 
Foreign debt channel + + + 
Portfolio channel + + + 
a)
 “– “: negative correlation between domestic currency and share prices. i.e. depreciation (appreciation) of the 
domestic currency goes along with an increase (decrease) of share prices. 
b)
 Potential and weaker indirect effect via foreign competitors on the domestic market. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.  Descriptive statistics 
 All stocks a) Exporting (N) Importing (N) Domestic (N) 
Russian Federation (RTS) 92 (133) 30 4 58 
CEEC-3: 57 (122) 21 3 33 
- Czech Republic(PX) 12 (55) 4 0 8 
- Hungary (BUX) 17 (18) 6 0 11 
- Poland (WIG) 28 (49) 11 3 14 
Total number: 149 (255) 51 7 91 
a)
 Number (N) of stocks available in DataStream (number of all stocks ever been included in the index). 
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TABLE 3a   Portfolio results for exporting firms and exchange rate regimes 
 
Results for the mean equation of a GJR (1,1) regression a) 
 Russia  CEEC-3 Czech Republic Hungary  Poland  
  Regime 
  
Regime 
 
Regime 
 
Regime 
c 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.307) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
rD 0.469*** 0.473*** 0.710*** 0.578*** 0.561*** 0.454*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 0.449*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆e€ -0.010 -0.005 0.393*** 0.017 0.001 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.354*** 0.304*** 
 (0.507) (0.794) (0.000) (0.436) (0.973) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆e$ -0.379*** -0.389*** 0.065*** 0.012 0.019 -0.030*** -0.026** 0.071*** 0.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.449) (0.226) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
JAN 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.804) (0.805) (0.042) (0.295) (0.189) (0.845) (0.835) (0.331) (0.288) 
DEZ 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.745) (0.748) (0.001) (0.383) (0.282) (0.893) (0.890) (0.000) (0.000) 
Euro 1999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000* -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.672) (0.710) (0.182) (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.073) (0.023)  (0.088) 
EU 2004 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.324) (0.319) (0.020) (0.956) (0.946) (0.242) (0.240) (0.045) (0.056) 
fix ∆e
€
 
 -0.004   
0.503*** 
(0.000) 
 0.012  0.200*** 
  (0.922)    (0.587)  (0.000) 
fix ∆e$  0.023    -0.056*  -0.182*** 
  (0.499)    (0.073)  (0.003) 
          
Adj. R2 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.12 0.09 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50 
DW b) 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
a)
 The exchange rate is given in indirect quotation (foreign to domestic currency). Thus, a negative coefficient 
means that a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency, or a decrease (increase) in the exchange 
rate, goes along with an increase (decrease) in share prices and vice versa. JAN, DEZ, Euro 1999, EU 2004 are 
the dummy variables as explained in Section 4. fix ∆e
€
 and fix ∆e$ are the interaction terms between exchange 
rate fluctuation and the exchange rate regime. In the case of the Czech Republic we cannot distinguish the 
effect of a fixed exchange rate separately for USD and EUR, since the CZK was pegged against a currency 
basket with constant weights throughout the whole period fixed exchange rate. 
b)
 Durbin Watson (DW) test 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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TABLE 3b   Portfolio results for domestic firms and exchange rate regimes 
 
Results for the mean equation of a GJR (1,1) regression a) 
 Russia  CEEC-3 Czech Republic Hungary  Poland  
  Regime   Regime 
 
Regime  Regime 
c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.269) (0.324) (0.758) (0.844) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000) (0.376) (0.658) 
∆e€ 0.029** 0.043*** 0.018 0.018 0.024* 0.199*** -0.176*** 0.091*** 0.299*** 
 (0.038) (0.010) (0.136) (0.136) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆e$ -0.342*** -0.375*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.022* 0.027* 0.043** 0.071*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.261) (0.261) (0.267) (0.096) (0.056) (0.037) (0.005) 
JAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.728) (0.728) (0.254) (0.254) (0.257) (0.001) (0.001) (0.672) (0.998) 
DEZ -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.098) (0.822) (0.823) (0.593) (0.597) (0.805) (0.988) 
Euro  -0.001** -0.001* 0.000 0.000** 0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
1999 (0.044) (0.083) (0.767) (0.026) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.428) (0.341) 
EU 2004 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.222) (0.208) (0.047) (0.048) (0.001) (0.000) 
fix ∆e
€
 
 0.022   -0.011  -0.029  -0.285*** 
  (0.578)   (0.772)  (0.539)  (0.000) 
fix ∆e$  0.109***   -0.054  -0.071*  -0.070 
  (0.000)   (0.233)  (0.068)  (0.390) 
          
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
DW b) 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
a)
 The exchange rate is given in indirect quotation (foreign to domestic currency). Thus, a negative coefficient 
means that a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency, or a decrease (increase) in the exchange 
rate, goes along with an increase (decrease) in share prices and vice versa. JAN, DEZ, Euro 1999, EU 2004 are 
the dummy variables as explained in Section 4. fix ∆e
€
 and fix ∆e$ are the interaction terms between exchange 
rate fluctuation and the exchange rate regime. 
b)
 Durbin Watson (DW) test 
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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TABLE 4   Portfolio results for exporting firms and subsamples 
 Russia   CEEC-3   
 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009  
 
       
rD 
0.281*** 
(0.000) 
0.391*** 
(0.000) 
0.883*** 
(0.000) 
0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.516*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000)  
        
∆e€ 0.093** (0.019) 
-0.017 
(0.446) 
0.012 
(0.542) 
0.506*** 
(0.000) 
0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.352*** 
(0.000)  
        
∆e$ -0.499*** (0.000) 
-0.280*** 
(0.000) 
-0.382*** 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.498) 
0.021 
(0.345) 
0.117*** 
(0.000)  
        
        
Adj. R2 0.539 0.166 0.441 0.629 0.442 0.648  
DW b) 2.008 1.956 1.678 1.841 1.801 1.849  
a)
 The exchange rate is given in indirect quotation (foreign to domestic currency). Thus, a negative coefficient 
means that a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency, or a decrease (increase) in the exchange 
rate, goes along with an increase (decrease) in share prices and vice versa. For the sake of brevity the constant 
and the coefficients for the dummies are not reported. 
b)
 Durbin Watson (DW) test 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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TABLE 5a   Exchange rate exposure for single stocks of exporting firmsa) 
 Coefficients of the GJR (1,1) regression (Tab.3)   
 Mean Median Min Max positive (significant) 
negative 
(significant) 
Russia       
EUR 0.043 -0.017 -0.217 1.681 13 (2) 17 (4) 
USD -0.301 -0.350 -0.747 1.658 2 (1) 28 (25) 
CEEC-3       
EUR 0.265 0.241 -0.073 1.107 19 (18) 2 (0) 
USD 0.020 0.015 -0.173 0.222 12 (8) 9 (4) 
 
 
 
TABLE 5b   Exchange rate exposure for single stocks of domestic firmsa) 
 Coefficients of the GJR (1,1) regression (Tab.3)   
 Mean Median Min Max positive (significant) 
negative 
(significant) 
Russia       
EUR 0.013 0.011 -1.141 0.615 30 (16) 28 (14) 
USD -0.303 -0.327 -0.736 0.276 6 (4) 52 (43) 
CEEC-3       
EUR 0.273 0.303 -0.050 0.818 31 (24) 2 (0) 
USD 0.023 0.000 -0.142 0.337 16 (7) 17 (6) 
a)
 The exchange rate is given in indirect quotation (foreign to domestic currency). Thus, a negative coefficient 
means that a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency, or a decrease (increase) in the exchange 
rate, goes along with an increase (decrease) in share prices and vice versa. 
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FIGURE 1.   Inflow of portfolio investments in equity in % of market capitalization 
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Source: EBRD, World Bank 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.   Private sector external debt in % of GDP a) b) 
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Source: National Central Banks, EUROSTAT, IMF 
a)
 Private Sector External Debt is calculated as the difference of the Gross External Debt (as it is defined by 
international organizations IMF, OECD, World Bank) and Public Sector External Debt (including General 
Government, Monetary Authorities, and other non-financial or financial corporations which are subject to 
control by government and monetary authorities). Thus, Private Sector External Debt excludes equity and 
financial derivative instruments from external debt. 
b) For Hungary, the data for 2009 was not yet available.  
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FIGURE 3a   Rolling regressions for exposure of exporting firms 
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FIGURE 3b   Rolling regressions for exposure of domestic firms 
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Note: The figures display the evolution of the coefficients γt,€ and γt,$  respectively for a rolling 
regression over a window of 500 observations. 
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Appendix  TABLE A.1 Information on exporting companies (data is taken from annual reports 2008) 
a) Export share is given as % of total sales in 2008. If this data was not available, the information in “About the company” (see italic marking) taken from the respective 
company’s homepage discloses why the respective company has been defined as an exporting firm.  
Name  
Code 
Sector About the company Export 
sharea) 
Export to: 
Czech Republic     
PEGAS NONWOVENS 
CZ:PEN(P) 
Nonwoven  
textiles 
Production of synthetic nonwoven textiles from polypropylene or polyethylene 
filaments 
80% Western Europe, Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, other 
PHILIP MORRIS ČR  
CZ:TAB(P) 
Tobacco  
products 
Leading international tobacco company. 15.6% share of the international cigarette 
market outside of the USA in 2008. 
59% 160 countries 
SPOLEK CHEM.HUT.V. 
CZ:SPC(P) 
 
Chemicals The Company exports and imports a significant portion of products (chemical 
substances and chemical preparations) and raw materials and is therefore significantly 
exposed to foreign exchange risk arising from various currency exposures primarily 
with respect to the Euro. 
85% UK, USA, Western Europe, 
(Germany, Netherlands, 
France, Italy, , Sweden, Great 
Britain, Austria, Switzerland, 
Spain, Belgium), Poland, 
Slovakia, Turkey 
UNIPETROL 
CZ:UNP(P) 
Crude oil  
processing,  
production of 
petrochemical 
products 
Production and sale of refinery products, chemical and petrochemical products, 
polymers, fertilizers, and specialty chemicals, retail distribution of motor fuels. 
Business based on exports and imports was significantly affected by the trends in 
currency exchange rates. Since 2005, part of Central Europe’s largest refining and 
petrochemical group, PKN Orlen. 
44% 
(2006),  
29% 
(2007) 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(Poland, Slovakia, Germany, 
Austria, Czech Republic) 
Hungary     
EGIS 
HN:EGI(P) 
Pharmaceuticals Manufacture and distribution of generic drugs and their active ingredients. In 
December 1995, France s Servier SAS acquired 50.9 percent of the company shares.  
approx.  
60% 
CIS states, other Eastern 
European countries, Western 
Europe, USA  
LINAMAR 
HN:LMH(P) 
Engineering and 
machinery 
One of the largest Hungarian agricultural machinery manufacturers. Also 
manufactures and distributes harvesting equipment, precision-made parts, primarily to 
the automotive industry. A subsidiary of the Canadian Linamar Corporation. 
88% European Union and non-EU, 
North America, other  
MOL 
HN:MMG(P) 
Oil and natural 
gas industry 
Major Central European company in the integrated oil and gas industry and largest 
enterprise in Hungary (turnover), founded in 1991. Dominant shareholder in Slovnaft, 
the leading Slovakian oil industry company (proportion of shares 98.4% in 2004), also 
of the Croatian company INA (25% in 2003). Market leader in its main activities both 
in Hungary and Slovakia. A substantial part of MOL s natural gas division has been 
sold, except for its natural gas transportation division. Strategic partnership with 
Gazprom since 2006.  
57% Operation in 10 Eastern 
European and Asian countries 
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PANNERGY 
HN:PAN(P) 
Renewable  
energy, 
packaging 
industry 
Investment and operating activities in the renewable energy resources sector, 
primarily geothermal energy. Plastic processing mainly for packaging industry, 
manufacturing of composite insulator. 
58% European Union  
(also Ukraine, Serbia) 
RICHTER 
HN:RIC(P)      
Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing and distribution of active ingredients and generic pharmaceuticals. 
Since 1997, the largest domestic drug manufacturer. 
81% European Union, USA, CIS, 
Japan, other  
TVK  
HN:TVK(P)        
Chemicals Production of ethylene and propylene from purchased naphtha and gasoil. A member 
of the MOL Group (94.86% of the company shares are owned indirectly by MOL). 
Legal predecessor was founded in 1953. One of the biggest integrated olefin and 
polyolefin producers in Europe. 
48% Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Austria, UK, France 
Poland     
AMICA 
PO:AMI 
Electro-
engineering 
Manufacture of cookers, launch, heating equipment. One of the most modern washing 
machine factories in Europe. Danish manufacturing and trading company.   
over 50% Eastern and Scandinavian 
market 
BIOTON 
PO:BIO(P) 
Pharmaceuticals, 
chemcals 
Pharmaceutical enterprise that produces modern medicine: recombined human insulin 
and antibiotics.  
41% 
(2007); 
32% 
(2008) 
Present on 5 continents, in 
particular in Russia, Asia and 
Chinese market (also Euro-
zone and CEEC) 
BUDIMEX 
PO:BUX 
Construction  Exports of construction services primarily to the developing markets of Asia and 
Africa and the COMECON. A leading construction company in Poland. A joint stock 
company. The Ferrovial Group, our strategic investor based in Spain, has been 
holding more than 50% of our share capital and votes in the General Meeting since 
2000. The fusion of the investing capacity, know-how, market position, and 
international experience of Ferrovial with our contacts in Poland and CEE markets 
provided us with new opportunities and helped to expand into other business areas.  
80% Germany (also Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine (3%)) 
CERSANIT 
PO:CER(P) 
Building  
materials  
Industry Building materials: national leader in the area of complex bathroom 
outfitting, strongly expanding the range of its export activity. Production and sales of 
sanitary ware products, ceramic tiles, shower cabins, acrylic bathtubs, acrylic wading 
paddles, bathroom furniture as well as other bathroom fixtures.  
40%  
DEBICA 
PO:DEB 
Automobiles  Automobiles: the leading Polish maker of passenger and commercial tires, all-steel 
truck tires, off-road tires, for agricultural machinery and other products from the tire 
industry. 
76% Germany, Slovenia, France, 
Russia, Italy, England, 
Romania, Spain and United 
Arab Emirates, also UK, USA, 
Brazil (60 countries) 
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KABLE HOLDING 
PO:SLA 
Electro-
engineering  
With manufacturing facilities in Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and China and sales offices all over the world, nkt cables is a market oriented, 
highly technological cables manufacturer with global ambitions. Provider of 
numerous consulting and engineering services. Owned by Danish NKT Holding A/S. 
80% Eastern Europe, Germany, 
Denmark, Asia, other 
KETY 
PO:KET 
Metals  Aluminium industry. Exports 33% of its products.  All countries in Europe and 
several ones in the world 
KGHM 
PO:KGH(P) 
Metals  KGHM is one of the largest Polish exporters, the 7th-largest copper producer and the 
3rd-largest silver producer in the world. The electrolytic copper produced by KGHM 
is registered by the London Metal Exchange as "Grade A". It produces also gold, lead, 
sulphuric acid and rock salt.  
70% China, France, Germany and 
the Czech Republic for copper. 
Great Britain, Belgium, 
Germany, USA for silver. 
MONDIE SWIECIE 
PO:MPP 
Wood & paper High quality containerboard and sack paper producer. One of five major packaging 
paper producers for European paper sack and corrugated board industries. 
74% Benelux, Great Britain, France, 
Sweden, other 
POLIMEXMS 
PO:PXM(P) 
Construction and 
installation 
services 
One of the biggest manufacturers and exporters of steel products and platform 
gratings in Poland, leader in the Polish engineering and construction sector. General 
contractor in the following sectors: power engineering, chemical, petrochemical and 
environmental protection.  
 European market 
STOMIL 
PO:SAN 
Chemicals, 
automobiles 
An enterprise active on European markets. Producer of rubber, rubber to metal goods, 
rubber to plastic and TPE goods used in car body sealing systems, car suspension and 
exhaust suspension systems, electrical, power transmission, fuel and cooling systems.: 
 Germany, Belgium, Belarus, 
Russia, other.  
Russia     
ACRON 
RS:ACR 
Chemical 
production 
A leading Russian and global mineral fertiliser producer (multi-nutrient fertilisers 
such as NPK and bulk blends, as well as straight nitrogen-based products such as 
urea, ammonium nitrate and UAN). 
70% China, Latin America, Asia, 
former USSR (over 50 
countries) 
CHELYABINSK 
MTL.PLT. 
RS:CMF 
Metals and 
mining 
Part of Mechel’s steel business. Mechel is one of the leading Russian mining and 
metals companies (mining, steel, ferroalloys and power), the largest Russian producer 
of special steel, the second largest Russian producer of long steel products as well. 
46%  
GAZPROM 
RS:GAZ 
Oil & gas, 
natural gas sales  
The world’s largest natural gas company controlling a quarter of the world’s total gas 
reserves. Key supplier of gas to Europe and the CIS, engaged in several 
transcontinental gas infrastructure projects. Russia’s largest company by turnover and 
market capitalisation. 50, 01% state-owned. Supplies approx. one third of Western 
Europe’s total gas imports (about 60% of revenues).  
60% Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
France, CIS (32 countries) 
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GAZPROM NEFT 
RS:SIB 
Oil & gas, oil 
sales 
One of the largest oil and gas producing companies in Russia. The main areas of 
Gazprom Neft’s business activity include oil and natural gas production, oil and gas 
field facility services, oil refining and marketing of petroleum products. The proven 
reserves of the company exceed 6,9 billion barrels, which ranks the company amongst 
the world’s twenty largest oil companies. 
Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
France, CIS (32 countries) 
IRKUT 
RS:SPC 
Machinery Aircraft-manufacturing corporation, capable of accomplishing research-and-
development, manufacturing, after-sales support, and upgrades of top-of-the-line 
aircraft ranging from civil and military aircraft to avionics and ground equipment. 
Accounts for over 15% of Russia’s defense export. The best Russian Exporter 2008.  
 37 countries 
MAGNITOGORSK 
IOSTL.WORKS 
RS:MAG 
Metals  
and mining 
The Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works Open Joint Stock Company (MMK) is one of 
the largest enterprises of the Russian steel sector accounting for about 20% of all steel 
products sold on the Russian market. 50% of products are sold in the export. 
 South East Asia, Middle East, 
Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, other CIS states 
(60 countries) 
MECHEL OAO 
RS:MSG 
Metals  
and mining 
One of the leading Russian mining and metals companies (mining, steel, ferroalloys 
and electric and heat power). Russia’s largest exporter of coking coal concentrate. 
Second largest producer of coking coal in Russia, controls 23% of the coking coal 
washing capacity in Russia. Subsidiaries in Kazakhstan, USA, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Lithuania. Products are sold in Russia as well as on international markets. Mechel is 
the only coal mining and metals company in the region of Eastern and Central Europe 
and Russia having its shares placed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
 International markets 
(Kazakhstan, USA, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Lithuania) 
MMC NORILSK NICKEL 
RS:GMK 
Metals  
and mining 
Mining and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel (hereinafter - MMC Norilsk 
Nickel or the Company) and its subsidiaries (hereinafter - the Group) is the world's 
leading producer of nickel and palladium, and one of the largest global producers of 
platinum and copper. The Group also produces a variety of by-products, such as 
cobalt, rhodium, silver, gold, iridium, ruthenium, selenium, tellurium and sulfur. The 
world’s leading producer of nickel, copper, and palladium, among other strategic 
metals. One of the most international of the Russian companies. 
 Australia, Botswana, Finland, 
the United States of America 
and South Africa. 
NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTE
KHIM 
RS:NKN 
Oil, chemical 
production 
High-tech petrochemical company producing rubber, plastics, monomers as feedstock 
to produce rubber and plastics, other petrochemical products. 
53% Europe, South-East Asia, 
America (50 countries) 
NOVATEK 
RS:NTV 
Oil & gas Russia’s largest independent gas producer and second-largest natural gas producer. 
Russia’s leading independent gas producer. 25% owned by Gazprom. Responsible for 
a major part of Russia’s gas production growth in recent years. Some 5% of Russia’s 
gas production and a similar share of gas reserves. Securing access to Gazprom-
controlled gas transportation infrastructure and to export pipelines in particular. 
72% 
(2007), 
64% 
(2006) 
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NOVOLIPETSK STEEL 
RS:NFM 
Metals  
and mining 
One of the world’s largest steel producers. An integrated steel-making company, we 
produce pig iron, slabs, hot-rolled, cold-rolled, galvanised, pre-painted, transformer 
and dynamo steel. It has won the 2007 Best Russian Exporter contest in the category 
of Ferrous Metals Best Exporter in the Industry.  
90% 
(2007) 
Europe, the Americas, Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East (70 
countries) 
NVYSK.COML.SEA 
PORT 
RS:NVR 
Transport Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port (“NCSP”) is a multi-purpose Russian stevedoring 
and port services company and Russia’s largest commercial sea port operator, 
according to Global Insight/ISL. NCSP is a key gateway for shipment of a wide range 
of Russian import and export cargoes, handling approximately 20% of Russia's 
exports and imports shipped via sea port during 2006, according to the Association of 
Russian Sea Ports. NCSP operates primarily at the Port of Novorossiysk (the “Port”), 
a multi-purpose, year-round, deep-water port located on the Russian shore of the 
Black Sea. 
48%  
OC ROSNEFT 
RS:RSF 
Oil & gas Leader of Russia’s petroleum industry, ranks among the world’s top publicly traded 
oil and gas companies. Russia’s largest oil producer (also by market capitalisation), 
100% state-owned. Acquired the core of the former oil company Yukos’ assets in 
2005. 25% of Russia’s oil output, 2-3% of the world’s reserves. 
62% Europe, CIS 
OGK-2 
RS:WHL 
Electric utilities The Open Joint-Stock Second Generation Company of the wholesale electricity 
market, abbreviated title: JSC “OGK-2”. Exporting electricity to neighbouring CIS 
countries and along a transit route to Western-European countries. 
 Western-European and 
neighbouring CIS countries 
(Georgia and Azerbaijan) 
OMZ URALMASH 
IZHORA GP. 
RS:UMA 
Production 
sector 
OMZ (Uralmash-Izhora Group) is the largest heavy industry company in Russia. It 
specializes in engineering, production, sales and maintenance of equipment and 
machines for the nuclear power, oil and gas, and mining industries, and also in the 
production of special steels and equipment for other industries.  
over 50% Asia, Europe, CIS 
LUKOIL (JSC) 
RS:LKO 
Oil & gas The 6th largest non-state publicly traded oil company worldwide by production of 
hydrocarbons. Russia’s 2nd largest oil producer. 2-3% of global oil reserves, 2.3% of 
global oil production, 20% of Russia’s oil output. The company with second largest 
trading volumes among foreign companies traded on the London Stock Exchange 
(IOB) in 2008. The only private Russian oil company whose share capital is 
dominated by minority stakeholders. The most international among the Russian 
companies. Russia’s largest oil exporter. 
aprox. 
64% 
CIS, the Baltic States, Finland, 
South-Eastern Europe, other 
POLYMETAL 
RS:POL 
Metals and 
mining 
Polymetal is a leading precious metals mining company. Polymetal is one of the top 
ten silver producers in the world and the largest in Russia.  
72%  
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POLYUS GOLD 
RS:PYG 
Metals and 
mining 
Polyus Gold (Open Joint Stock Company, OJSC) is a leading gold producer. The sales 
structure changed significantly. 2006: export accounted for almost 30% of sales. 
2007: gold was largely sold in the domestic market to Russian banks (87% of sales). 
The increase of sales in the domestic market is explained by more favorable contracts 
terms concluded with Russian banks. 
30% 
(2006) 
Credit Suisse (Zurich, 
Switzerland) 
RASPADSKAYA 
RS:RAS 
Metals and 
mining 
Raspadskaya is a compact integrated coal mining and enrichment complex. One of the 
leading suppliers to the largest Russian smelters, including Novolipetsk Steel, 
Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Works and Nizhniy Tagil Iron & Steel Works. 
approx.  
32 % 
Eastern Europe (Ukraine, 
Romania, Hungry, Bulgaria), 
South-Asia (India, Japan and 
South Korea) 
SEVERSTAL 
RS:CHM 
Metals and 
mining 
The 12th largest steel producer in the world, a steel leader in Russia and the CIS. 
Integrated steel and mining business model worldwide, mining segment is one of 
Russia’s three largest producers of iron ore concentrate (with a market share of 9.1%), 
pellets (30%) and coking coal (14,7%). The company’s revenues grew by nearly 50% 
in 2008, the strongest performance among the key Russian metal companies. Through 
a series of acquisitions in 2008, Severstal entered the gold mining industry and aims 
to become one of the leading producers in Russia.  
53% Europe and Asia; USA, Central 
and South America, Africa,  
Middle East, Europe, Central 
and South East Asia  
SLAVNEFT 
MEGIONNEFTEGAZ 
RS:MFG 
Oil & gas The Group's principal activities are the extraction, production of oil and gas  
 
47%  
SURGUTNEFTEGAS 
RS:SNG; 
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 
PREF. 
RS:SNP 
Oil & gas One of the largest oil companies in Russia. Prospecting, gas- and oil-field 
construction and development, oil and gas production and marketing, oil and 
petrochemical products producing and marketing come within the scope of the 
company’s activities. Export of crude oil and petroleum products: 55% and 61% in 
2006. 
 CIS and Western Europe 
TMK OAO 
RS:TUE 
Production 
sector 
One of the world's largest oil and gas pipe producers and the market leader of the 
Russian pipe industry. Shipments of longitudinal welded large-diameter pipes for the 
Russian part of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline spur to China. 
TMK is Russia’s largest exporter of pipe products, accounting for about 52% of all 
Russian steel pipe exports. 
 Europe, Middle East, North 
Africa, South and South-East 
Asia, CIS (over 60 countries) 
TRANSNEFT PREF. 
RS:TRP 
Oil & gas, oil 
transporting. 
Transneft is Russia’s primary crude oil export channel. Its network is fully 
interconnected with the European pipeline system. 
approx. 
60% 
Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic 
countries, North America and 
Europe 
UDMURTNEFT PREF. 
RS:UDP 
Oil & gas Largest oil-producing enterprise in the Udmurt Republic. Holds 60 hydrocarbon 
exploration and production licenses. Rosneft indirectly holds 49.51% in Udmurtneft. 
63,6% China, Europe 
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UFA ENGINE PLANT 
RS:UFM 
Production 
sector 
Production and service of the turbo-jet aviamotors. over 70% 49 countries (e.i. Vietnam) 
URALKALIY 
RS:URK 
Chemical 
production 
One of the world’s leading producers of potash fertiliser and one of Russia’s largest 
chemical companies. Primarily an export business. Sales to customers in Russia 
account for around 10% of production. Leading market position in developing 
markets. 
89% China, Brazil, South-East Asia 
and India, also Europe, Africa, 
the Middle East and USA 
VSMPO 
RS:VS 
Metals and 
mining 
The world's largest manufacturer of titanium - ingots and all kinds of semi finished 
items from titanium alloys. More than three quarters of company output is exported 
mainly to large world aircraft manufacturer such as Boeing, EADS/Airbus, General 
Electric. 
 more than 350 firms in 50 
countries  
WIMM-BILL-DANN 
FOODS 
RS:WBD 
Food industry Market leader in dairy products and children’s food in Russia and one of the leading 
players in the market for non-alcoholic drinks in Russia and the CIS. A three-time 
recipient of “The Best Industry Sector Exporter” award of the Russian Ministry of 
Economic Development. Export of “Essentuki” mineral water. Around 280 million 
people in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the countries of Central Asia buy Wimm-Bill-
Dann’s products 
 USA, Canada, France, China, 
Mongolia, Israel, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Georgia, Armenia 
